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Non-technical summary
The acidification of ecosystems is still an unsolved problem in Europe. Thus, in the
Sulphur Protocol of Oslo, signed in 1994, most European countries agreed on
national sulphur emission ceilings for the year 2000 that have been derived mainly
on the basis of the critical loads concept. In view of this, the paper develops a
practicable model of tradable SO2-permits for the EU-15 public power producers
who contribute to about 30% of all anthropogenic SO2-emissions. For this sector the
scheme would become the main instrument to curb SO2-emissions. A short
evaluation of the literature on spatially differentiated permit systems, and the
empirical evidence on the U.S. Acid Rain Program and the Californian RECLAIM
Program lead to the choice of a spatially undifferentiated SO2-permit system as a
starting-point for the model’s design. The inherent conflict between ecological
effectivity and economic efficiency is assessed using an applied general equilibrium
model for the European Union. Simulations indicate that an undifferentiated SO2-
permit system will save costs, but violates the national deposition targets in all
countries with the exceptions of Greece, Portugal and Spain. The macroecenomic
impacts turn out to be small; they lay within a range of ±0.5 per cent for all countries
(based on the business-as-usual case). In order to address the ecological needs a
bundle of measures counteracting possible hot spots is proposed whose use should
be graded according to their intensity of interference, in order to keep the degrees of
freedom for all agents in the market as high as possible. Concerning the initial
allocation of SO2-permits to the public power producers a long-term transition from a
mode of grandfathering to the mode of a free auction is chosen. This "limited
grandfathering" is implemented by a primary distribution of permits to existing
sources which only covers the expected remaining regular lifetime of the respective
plant type.
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Abstract
In this paper, a practicable scheme of SO2-emission permits for European power
producers is developed. Background is the second UN-ECE Sulphur Protocol from
1994 (Protocol of Oslo). After discussing some theoretical models of spatially
differentiated permit schemes, evaluating the U.S. Acid Rain and RECLAIM
Program, and considering the setting in the EU-15 countries, a scheme of locally
undifferentiated emission permits is proposed which is distinguished by a high
degree of both economic efficiency and market functioning. However, as our model
simulations indicate, national deposition targets will be violated in all probability
due to the scheme’s missing differentiation regarding the receptors. The risk of hot
spots is addressed adequately by a differentiated bundle of countermeasures. The
general economic impact of an EU-wide permit scheme is low, and, in terms of
change in GDP, lower compared to a non-coordinated SO2 policy. The proposed
mode of the initial permit allocation allows for early price signals and guarantees
maximum static and dynamic efficiency. Balancing the interests of existing and new
emitters, a long-term transition from the grandfathering to the free auction procedure
is chosen.
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11 Introduction
Acidification is a still unsolved problem in Europe. Consequently, Sweden, which is
among the countries most affected, prompted a request from the Environment
Council to the European Commission to develop a coherent acidification strategy
(ENVIRONMENT WATCH 1997). In March 1997, the Commission published its
"Communication to the Council and the European Parliament on a Community
Strategy to Combat Acidification" (COM(97) 88 final). It states that in 1990 the
critical loads2 for acidification were exceeded over an area of more than 32 million
hectares, i.e. 24 per cent of the ecosystems were unprotected. Projections indicate
that, if current, and if well-advance planned legislation is fully implemented in all
fifteen European Union (EU)-member countries, the ecosystem protection would
increase to 93.5 per cent in 2010. Nevertheless, to reach the declared 50 per cent
gap-closure interim target3 across the EU, a protection rate of 96.7 per cent is
necessary. This implies an EU-wide reduction of the projected SO2-emissions in
2010 of 5.6 million tons to 2.7 million tons.
Consequently, the Commission proposes further measures beyond existing
legislation. Key elements are national emission ceilings for a number of key
pollutants, the ratification of the 1994 Sulphur Protocol of Oslo, and a Directive on
the sulphur content of gas oils and heavy fuel oils. In the Protocol of Oslo, 28
European countries, as well as Canada, agreed on national sulphur emission ceilings
for the year 2000 (for some countries, 2005 and 2010, too). Due to a slow process of
national ratification, the Protocol has not yet been put in force.
Under the heading "economic instruments", the Commission enumerates in its
strategy paper the main types of instruments: charges/taxes, subsidies, tradable
emission permits, and environmental agreements. The proposed national ceilings are
considered as "anchoring points for the member states for designing national
economic instruments (or regulations) that go beyond common minimum
environmental requirements" (COM(97) 88 final, Section 4.9). Concerning the
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 The Commission gives a very vivid definition: "The critical load indicates the
sensitivity of a particular environment by defining how much exposure to
pollution it can tolerate before a long-lasting or other significant damage occurs.
[...] depositions above the critical loads are not sustainable in the long term".
(COM(97) 88 final, Section 1 of the Annex).
3
 This gap-closure concept aims at closing the difference between the level of
ecosystem protection in 1990 and the ultimate target of 100 per cent ecosystem
protection, by 50 per cent in each EMEP grid cell in the EC by the year 2010 (cf.
COM(97) 88 final, Section 2 of the Annex). An EMEP grid cell is a 150×150
kilometres cell of a mapping scheme used to evaluate critical loads in Europe.
2ceilings from the Protocol of Oslo, the United Nations Economic Commission for
Europe states, that "in order to deal with this inherent uncertainty [on abatement
costs], countries could be given some flexibility in how they meet their
commitments. One way is to give countries the option to exchange emission
reduction commitments. […] The possibility for exchange will contribute to cost-
effectiveness in the allocation of abatement measures over time …" (UN-ECE
1991:§22).
In line with this political development, the paper proposes a practicable model of
tradable SO2-permits for the EU-15 public power producers who contribute to about
30% of all anthropogenic SO2-emissions. For this sector, the scheme would become
the main instrument to curb SO2-emissions. It would mean a clear turning-away from
a policy which is dominated by command and control measures. On the EU level,
these are mainly the directives on large combustion plants (88/609/EEC) and on
sulphur in liquid fuels (93/12/EEC), laying down limit values for emissions, and for
sulphur content of certain liquid fuels. On the national level, patterns of
environmental regulation of air pollutants differ between countries. While Germany
and Austria confine themselves to command and control policies, Denmark, Finland
and Sweden use emission limit values in conjunction with taxes and charges. The
southern countries tend to prefer a combination of emission limit values and
subsidies.4
In the following, we summarize the theoretical literature on tradable emission
permits with emphasis on their ability to address spatial aspects (Section 2). Section
3 contains general equilibrium modelling results of the possible effects of an EU-
wide scheme of spatially undifferentiated permits. The aim is to assess the inherent
conflict between ecological effectivity of such permits and their economic efficiency.
Section 4 contains empirical evidence on the functioning of permits markets, namely
of the U.S. Acid Rain Program and the Californian RECLAIM Program. Section 5
addresses the European energy sector, i.e. the existing pattern of SO2-emission
control, and the potential limits for a functioning permits market by market power
and low trading volumes. Finally, we present the proposed scheme in Section 6, and
draw conclusions in Section 7.
2 Theory of environmental tradable permits
Environmental permits, partly rooted in the property rights based Coase-concept,
constitute a solution to environmental problems which is highly conformant to the
market system. The state merely establishes an ecological framework, and permit
trade allows for an efficient allocation of the distributed 'rights to pollute'.
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 See KOSCHEL et al. (1998) for further details.
3Basically, a permit system consists of three elements (KOUTSTAAL/NENTJES 1995, p.
220):
- The ecological element concerns a politically desired amount of total emissions for
a number of countries - mostly signatories of an international agreement - or a
single nation. The quantity of allowed emissions must be attested in an equivalent
number of emission rights. Fixing the total amount of emissions reduces the
control authority’s uncertainty about environmental effectiveness and adjustment
costs. Even without any information about aggregate marginal cost curves, the
control authority can be sure that the environmental target will be met.5
- The distributive element considers the initial allocation of tradable permits among
nations or between sectors and specific sources within one country. Comparable to
a rule for the reimbursement of tax revenues, the rule for the initial allocation
mainly determines the burden sharing of costs and, thus, concerns equity aspects.
- The economic element concerns the efficiency induced by trade. Tradable permits
theoretically constitute a cost-efficient option for implementing emission reduction
goals, provided that some conditions are satisfied (MONTGOMERY 1972). These
include negligible transaction costs, a competitive permit market6, and the
assumption that sources minimize their control costs (i.e. the costs of control
technology investments and the net revenue of trading permits).
The functioning of tradable permits can be explained by the following mechanism:
Within an emission permit system, the firms can choose between, 1. the purchase of
tradable permits (or renunciation of selling permits) and emission of the
corresponding amount of pollutants, or 2. the investment in new emission control
technologies and renunciation of purchase of permits (or sale of unused permits).
Each firm decides whether it is more efficient to buy a permit or to invest in
additional, potentially improved control technologies. Whereas a policy of technical
standards reduces the firm’s private autonomy and its flexibility of technology choice
considerably, a policy of emission permits (as well as of emission charges)
guarantees the maximum degree of freedom concerning the individual adjustment
strategy. As all private decisions are made to fit in with the same permit price that
clears the market, marginal abatement costs are equalized across all firms
participating in trade. The costs of meeting a given emission target are minimized.
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 In contrast to an emission charge in which the total amount of actual emissions is
not fixed, but the price is.
6
 The problem of strategic manipulation and oligopolistic interaction in tradable
permit markets has been addressed in some studies, such as HAHN (1984),
TIETENBERG (1990), MISIOLEK/ELDER (1989) and MØRCH VON DER FEHR (1993).
Indeed, when competition is not perfect, i.e. a single firm has some market power,
it may use this to manipulate the market for permits to its own advantage. Thus, it
is important to guarantee that a sufficient number of firms is involved.
4Moreover, the price signals of the permits markets not only assure a short-term
efficient allocation of abatement measures, but also enhance competition between
existing abatement options and give incentives to the invention and diffusion of new
abatement options. Compared to regulatory instruments, tradable permits are
dynamically more efficient. Since unused permits can be sold on the market and
revenue can be used for financing investment, environmental technical progress will
be stimulated permanently, as long as any ’opportunity costs’ of using a permit exist
(TIETENBERG 1994).
It was also shown by MONTGOMERY (1972) that, given a set of conditions, the initial
permit allocation has no consequences for the allocative efficiency: it represents a
lump-sum endowment which does not affect marginal choices. As within a permit
system equity and efficiency aspects can be handled separately, the initial allocation
can be used to accomplish distributional goals without interfering with cost-
efficiency goals (TIETENBERG 1983, p. 240, 1990, p. 22). The absence of the usual
equity-efficiency tradeoff is an attractive characteristic of the tradable permit
approach, in particular for its application at the international level. For example, an
international CO2 permit system could address questions of inter-country equity
arising from the concept of sustainable development without interfering with the
system’s efficiency (ROSE/STEVENS 1996). However, a study of SCHMIDT/KOSCHEL
(1998) emphasizes the importance of considering full general equilibrium effects
when analysing burden sharing among several countries under different equity rules
within a tradable permit system.
An SO2 tradable permit regime can operate at the national or international level.
Implementing a national tradable permit system requires national emission reduction
targets that can be drawn from an international agreement such as the Protocol of
Oslo. These targets will be realized exactly and cost-efficiently within the boundaries
of each country. Obviously, the national emission reduction targets laid down in the
Protocol of Oslo will very probably not ensure a cost-efficient solution at the
international level, especially if abatement costs differ across countries. Thus, a
national implementation of a tradable permit system for SO2 gives away cost saving
potentials. In contrast to this, an international tradable permit system offers more
flexibility concerning the international emission structure. The emission reduction
targets emerging from the Protocol of Oslo now could serve as the basis for the
initial allocation of permits across all participating nations. As already mentioned,
the initial allocation is a critical point of a tradable permit system as it is the main
factor for the burden sharing among countries. Ultimately, the Protocol of Oslo only
constitutes the ‘distributive element’ of a permit system. Only the subsequent
reallocation of permits via trade between countries may lead to a cost-efficient
allocation of emission reduction measures.
Basically, the ecologically optimal design and appropriateness of tradable permits
crucially depend on the type of pollutant that has to be controlled. As Table 1
5indicates, economic theory suggests many tradable permits models with different
spatial dimension (see also KLAASSEN 1996b, and TIETENBERG 1995). Unfortunately,
the models with the highest appeal in terms of ecological effectivity are characterised
by a lack in practicability. This is due to the fact that the higher the degree of spatial
differentiation, the higher the ecological goal-conformity and transaction costs
related to the gathering and evaluation of information.
6Table 1: Evaluation of emission permits schemes for SO2
Permits 
Scheme 
                         
Criteria..........
.................... 
AP        
(ambient 
permits)
 ADP       
(ambient 
differentiated 
permits)
EDP              
(emission discharge 
permits)
LDP         
(local discharge 
permits)
ERT             
(exchange-rate 
trading)
UDP      
(undifferentiated 
discharge 
permits)
Division of the 
region into 
zones?
no
yes, with interzonal 
trade
yes, without interzonal 
trade
yes, without 
interzonal trade
yes, with interzonal 
trade no
Number of 
independent 
permits markets
one deposition 
target per 
receptor / one 
permits market 
per receptor 
one deposition 
target per receptor / 
deposition targets 
are operationalizied 
by emission targets 
/ one permits 
market per receptor 
receptor-based deposition 
targets are operationalized 
by a single emission 
target, valid for all zones / 
one permits market per 
zone 
receptor-based 
deposition targets 
are operationalized 
by zonal emission 
targets / one 
permits market per 
zone 
one emission target 
(derived from the set of 
deposition targets) - one 
permit market with fixed 
exchange-rate emission 
trading 
one emission target 
(derived from the 
set of deposition 
targets) - one 
permits market 
Information 
requirements on 
the part of the 
trading partners
individual 
emitter: own 
emissions and 
individual 
matrix of 
transport 
coefficients
individual emitter: 
own emissions
individual emitter: own 
emissions
individual emitter: 
own emissions
countries/zones: own 
emissions and interzonal 
exchange rates
individual emitter: 
own emissions
Information 
requirements on 
the part of the 
authority 
---
matrix of transport 
coefficients of the 
emitters covered by 
each zone
matrix of transport 
coefficients of the emitters 
covered by each zone ; 
individual cost functions 
of all emitters 
matrix of transport 
coefficients of the 
emitters covered by 
each zone; 
individual cost 
functions of all 
emitters 
ratios of  marginal 
abatement costs in the 
cost-minimum (in order 
to fix exchange rates 
between countries)
cost functions of 
emitters and ex 
post-market 
allocation
Ecological 
effectivity (in 
practice, i.e. when 
considering 
information 
deficits)
assured relatively well 
assured not assured
not assured; even 
less assured than 
with EDP
not assured
not assured 
(assured only if 
total emissions are 
reduced 
sufficiently)
Cost-efficiency 
(in practice) assured
relatively high, but 
lower than with an 
AP
lower than with an ADP 
(thin market problem)
lower than with an 
EDP (thin market 
problem)
efficiency gains possible 
vs. cost minimum plus 
current reduction plan
low because the 
overall reduction of 
emissions is too 
high 
Transaction costs very high high low low very low very low
Practical 
experience --- --- --- --- ---
ARP, RECLAIM, 
Basler emissions 
trading
Practicability for  
SO2
not practicable: 
diffusion too 
complex, 
transaction 
costs too high
potentially 
practicable, yet 
institutions for 
lowering 
transaction costs 
are necessary
potentially practicable, yet 
the problem of thin 
markets arises
less practicable 
than UDP
possibly practicable if 
modified adequately
 potentially 
practicable if used 
in combination 
with measures of 
ecological fine 
tuning 
An ambient permits scheme, for example (see Figure 1), would theoretically
establish one market for each receptor point, thus demanding emission sources to
purchase a high number of different permits on different markets according to the
diffusion characteristics of its emissions. The parallelism of several permits markets
7- which is an inherent feature of all spatially differentiated schemes - raises the risk
costs of emission sources. As the different markets will tend to be small, they may
not obtain all necessary permits, or only at prices that are difficult to forecast. This
again raises the opportunity costs of relying on permits and thus the attractiveness of
technical solutions (e.g. a flue gas desulphurization process).
As the permits market size corrrelates positively with its liquidity and with the
stability of the price signals sent out, a permits scheme should establish as big and as
few as possible permits markets. However, not only low risk costs but also low
transaction costs contribute to a functioning permits market. Thus, the information
requirement for the affected emission sources during the program should be kept
low, and practicability high. Also, administrative costs, fees etc. should be taken into
consideration in order to increase the scheme’s acceptance from the side of the
emission sources and the involved supervising agencies. Comparing the schemes
discussed in Table 1 from this perspective, the models with the highest appeal in
terms of maximum permits market size and minimum transaction costs are the model
of exchange-rate trading (ERT), proposed by KLAASSEN et al. (1994), as well as a
scheme of locally undifferentiated discharge permits (UDP). Only these both models
seem to be possible for the design of a European SO2-permit system.
total volume of ambient 
permits of type I 
E 1 E 2
deposition target I
trade in ambient permits I:    1:1 
trade in ambient permits II:   1:1 
trade in ambient permits III:  1:1
receptor I
total volume of ambient 
permits of type II 
deposition target II
receptor II
total volume of ambient 
permits of type III 
deposition target III
receptor III
emissions 
sources:
Figure 1:Ambient permits (AP)
  total volume of 
discharge permits 
 
E 1 E 2
trade in discharge permits  1:1
system of receptors
set of deposition targets
emissions 
sources:
Figure 2:Undifferentiated
discharge permits (UDP)
In the European context, a pure UDP-system establishes a single permits market and
allows all emission sources to trade permits within the whole European region on a
one-to-one basis (see Figure 2). Following the UDP-approach, Klaassen et al.
suggests a relatively simple system with a single market for tradable emission
permits, too. But, considering the local dimension of SO2 emissions, they divide the
European market region into several zones which are represented by European
countries. Between these zones, emission permits can be traded on the basis of
8(initially) fixed exchange rates that account for the impact of the location of the
emission sources on the deposition. "The exchange rate gives the volume of
emissions one source has to decrease when another source increases its emissions
with one unit" (KLAASSEN et al. 1994, p. 309). Based on the cost-optimal solution7,
in the ERT-model of Klaassen et al. the exchange rate between two sources is based
on the ratio of the marginal abatement costs in the cost minimum. This takes into
account the sum of the transportation coefficients weighted by the shadow price of
the binding receptors in the optimum.
A comparison of the two models - in view of the same emission reduction target for a
whole region - is not easy to draw. The UDP-scheme is administratively very simple
to implement. In the ERT-model, too, the addressees of the scheme can easily grasp
its mechanisms and its economic implications as the information requirements are
low and as exchange rates are fixed initially. In comparison to a situation without
any emission trading, cost savings will be obtained in both cases. Under a UDP-
scheme, the market volume would tend to be higher as it eases the exchange of
emission permits that are not equivalent from an ecological perspective.
Interestingly, it was exactly this argument that led the U.S. Senate to drop an earlier
proposal for a trading scheme that included spatial trade restrictions (see WASMEIER
1992, p. 224).
Different from a CO2-emission permits scheme, location issues cannot be ignored in
the context of SO2 for ecological reasons. Theoretically, a UDP-permit system could
result in deleterious emission concentrations and depositions. The ERT-model tries
to cushion this conflict by fixed exchange-rate emission trading between countries.
But as the problem of information connected to the fixing and the regular revision of
the exchange rates cannot be solved completely, the fulfillment of the deposition
targets can not be guaranteed, either. In practice, it would therefore be necessary to
combine such a system with measures preventing a violation of the targets.
In all probability, the ecological deficiencies are greater with a pure UDP-scheme
than under an ERT-scheme. The empirical evidence on this topic is tested in the next
section. As the results indicate violations of some regional deposition targets, a
UDP-system must, in practice, be combined with measures of ecological fine tuning
("hot spot measures"). Such a combination would nevertheless appear to be more
attractive for empirical application than an ERT-scheme (combined with similar hot
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 The optimisation problem asks for the emission vector for which the desired levels
of deposition at the receptor points are realised at minimal total costs (aggregated
over all source abatement costs). A necessary condition for an interior solution is
that the marginal abatement costs of source i equals the sum of the shadow price
weighted transportation coefficients for emissions of source i to the several
receptors.
9spot measures) as it avoids the aforementioned information problems for the central
authority when fixing the exchange rates. In addition, we can look back to some
practical experiences in the U.S. with UDP-schemes for SO2 (see Section 4).
What is more, the cost efficiency of a an UDP-scheme enables the execution of more
ambitious emission reduction goals in the future and would therefore increase the
dynamic efficiency of the entire set of environmental policy measures in Europe. An
ecologically accurate tradable permits system with non-liquid markets and unstable
prices would be more likely to run contrary to the long-term aim of a sustainable
management of emissions in the sense of the critical loads concept pursued by the
Protocol of Oslo.
3 Macro-economic and sectoral impacts of an EU-wide tradable
permits scheme for SO2
To estimate the economic and ecological effects of a European scheme of spatially
undifferentiated SO2-permits (UDP) for public power producers, two scenarios were
simulated using the computable general equilibrium model GEM-E38 for eleven EU-
member states:9
• In Scenario 1, emission reduction targets for the national public utilities, which
were derived from the Protocol of Oslo,10 are put into action for the electricity
sector on a national level using nationally tradable permits systems (non-
coordinated policy).
• In Scenario 2, the power producers emission reduction targets are aggregated for
the eleven countries covered in the model. This single reduction target is achieved
by imposing a single, EU-wide market for tradable permits. In this type of policy,
the opportunities of emission reduction will be exhausted in the different
countries according to their cost-effectiveness (coordinated policy).
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 The GEM-E3 model was developed on behalf of the European Commission
(DGXII) by P. Capros, T. Georgakopoulos (National Technical University of
Athens), S. Proost, D. Van Regemorter (Catholic University of Leuven),
K. Conrad, T.F.N. Schmidt (University of Mannheim, ZEW Mannheim). Further
references and information are given in CAPROS et al. (1997).
9 See also SCHMIDT (1998).
10
 Column SO2-Reduction PP in Scenario 1 of Table 2 contains the power producers’
reduction rates (2005 vs. 1990) on which the calculations in both scenarios are
based. They are derived from the respective national total emission ceilings laid
down in the Protocol of Oslo. The guiding principle was to let power producers
with high SO2-emission reduction rates in the past contribute less to the national
commitment than in those countries where their contribution was minor.
10
The economic effects of the non-coordinated and the coordinated policies are minor
(see Table 2). The variation in the rates of all aggregated macro variables lies in both
scenarios in general (with the exception of Spain) within a range of ± 0,5 per cent.11
Due to transboundary air pollution, the development of national depositions of
sulphur is not proportional to the national abatement efforts in both scenarios. In an
EU-wide scheme of permit trade Belgium, Germany, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy,
the Netherlands and the United Kingdom observe higher depositions than in the non-
coordinated Scenario 1, whereas depositions are lower in Greece, Portugal and
Spain. This corresponds with deviations from the national emission ceilings agreed
on in the Protocol of Oslo.
The model results for the coordinated scenario suggest two conclusions: 1. the
proposed spatially undifferentiated SO2-permits scheme for European power
producers must be augmented by hot spot measures; Section 6 will explain which
kind of measures seem appropriate. 2. the Parties of the Protocol will have to agree
on rules on how to realize Article 3 (7) of the Protocol, which allows for the joint
implementation of the obligations by two or more Parties.
Both scenarios differ in their effect on permit prices. Scenario 2 leads to a single
permit price of 1,419 ECU/ton of SO2 in all EU-11 countries. Plants that already
undertook large emission reduction efforts before 1990 prefer to buy permits than to
invest in further abatement measures. Hence, there is a net demand for permits in
Germany, Denmark, France, Italy, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. In the
non-coordinated case of Scenario 1 permit prices vary between 250 ECU/ton of SO2
in Spain and 3,195 ECU/ton of SO2 in Germany. This outcome reflects the
differences in marginal reduction costs and reduction targets of countries. A model
run taking into account actual abatement efforts after 1990 may change the results. In
particular, German power plants located in the New Bundesländer, which carried out
large investments in recent years, can expect to become net sellers of permits and
may thus enjoy a partial financial compensation, if permits are initially allocated by a
grandfathering procedure.
Both scenarios imply a loss in GDP. At the EU level, this loss is smaller under the
coordinated regime of Scenario 2 (-0.08 per cent) than under the regime of Scenario
1 (-0.12 per cent). Under the coordinated policy, the distribution of total economic
burden is altered to the disadvantage of those countries that sell permits, i.e. those
countries that take the higher reduction efforts in comparison to Scenario 1 are worse
off. This is due to the fact that the latter observe higher prices (in particular the price
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 Percentage change of counterfactual equilibrium (policy scenario) to reference
equilibrium (business-as-usual scenario). The business-as-usual scenario considers
country specific emission reductions undertaken up to the year 1990.
11
for electricity) when a coordinated approach is taken. The negative effect of this rise
in national prices is not fully compensated by the revenue from the (net) sale of
permits to other countries, as the decision on buying permits or abating is taken by
the electricity companies, which are interested in minimizing their individual costs.
The economy-wide spill-over effects of higher electricity prices on the rest of the
economy are not incorporated in their calculation and are therefore not reflected in
the permit price.
From this, we draw a the conclusion that some countries may oppose an EU-wide
permits scheme for power producers. Thus, we suggest the establishment of a
compensation mechanism for the countries selling more permits in the coordinated
than in the non-coordinated case. Of course, measurement of economic burdens to
the affected countries will be difficult.
According to sectoral effects on an aggregate European level, most sectors
(exceptions are the sectors oil, gas and energy intensive industry) have to accept a
reduction of their gross production under both a non-coordinated and a coordinated
policy. The following statements apply to Scenario 1 as well as Scenario 2 (cf.
KOSCHEL et al. 1998):
- The winners of a policy of SO2 permits are the sectors oil and gas; they show an
absolute growth in production, resulting in a growing share of the European gross
production.
- The sectors agriculture, consumer goods industries, transport, services and non-
market services show absolute decreases of production in comparison to the
reference scenario, but nevertheless show a growth of their shares in the whole of
the European gross production.
- The losers of a SO2-permits policy are the sectors coal, electricity, as well as
equipment goods industries. Their gross production falls more than the average
aggregated over all sectors, which means that their competitive position to the
other sectors gets worse.
These results lead to the fourth conclusion: The proposed scheme may be opposed by
inter-country coalitions of the sectors severely hit by rising electricity prices.
Therefore, the scheme should offer tools to cushion the adaption processes which
will be necessary for these sectors.
Table 2: Simulation results of non-coordinated and coordinated SO2-emission permits schemes in the European Union
GDP       
[%]
Production 
[%]
Private Con-
sumption [%]
Investment 
[%]
Exports        
[%]
Imports    
[%]
Employment 
[%]
Belgium -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 -0.01
Germany -0.19 -0.08 -0.12 -0.06 -0.15 0.18 -0.01
Denmark -0.15 -0.04 -0.15 0.00 -0.11 0.05 0.01
France -0.05 -0.03 -0.02 0.01 -0.10 0.06 -0.01
Greece -0.04 -0.08 -0.07 -0.12 0.00 -0.10 -0.02
Ireland -0.02 -0.03 0.03 -0.06 -0.07 -0.04 -0.03
Italy -0.06 -0.03 -0.01 0.00 -0.13 0.09 -0.01
Netherlands -0.03 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 0.01 -0.01
Portugal 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.00
Spain -0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.02 -0.03 0.02 -0.01
Great Britain -0.24 -0.16 -0.26 0.01 -0.22 0.15 -0.03
EU-11 -0.12 -0.06 -0.09 -0.02 -0.15 0.18 -0.01
Rest of World - - - - 0.18 -0.15 -
After Tax 
Real Wage 
Rate [%]
Non-Labour 
Income [%]
Permits Price   
[ECU/t SO2 ]
SO 2 -
Reduction 
PP [%]
national SO 2 -
Reduction [%]
SO2 -
Depositions 
[%]
Deviation from 
Oslo De-
positions [%]
Belgium -0.01 0.00 1,182 21 8 -30 0
Germany -0.17 -0.09 3,195 74 41 -22 0
Denmark -0.18 0.00 2,178 47 31 -30 0
France -0.03 0.00 2,648 74 21 -17 0
Greece -0.10 -0.04 719 24 17 -7 0
Ireland 0.01 0.07 749 10 1 -33 0
Italy -0.02 0.00 1,976 50 22 -12 0
Netherlands -0.04 -0.01 1,886 54 30 -34 0
Portugal -0.01 -0.02 0 0 0 -4 0
Spain -0.01 0.01 250 5 3 -4 0
Great Britain -0.34 -0.14 1,972 62 41 -36 0
EU-11 - - - 42 25 -21 0
Rest of World - - - - - - -
Scenario 1: Non-coordinated national permits schemes
GDP       
[%]
Production 
[%]
Private Con-
sumption [%]
Investment 
[%]
Exports        
[%]
Imports    
[%]
Employment 
[%]
Belgium -0.03 -0.01 0.00 0.02 -0.03 0.01 -0.01
Germany -0.03 -0.06 -0.14 -0.09 0.06 -0.14 0.00
Denmark -0.03 -0.05 -0.14 -0.05 -0.01 -0.12 0.00
France -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.00
Greece -0.16 -0.06 0.03 0.00 -0.29 0.44 -0.01
Ireland -0.04 -0.03 0.09 -0.02 -0.11 0.01 -0.04
Italy -0.03 -0.03 -0.05 -0.03 -0.04 -0.05 0.00
Netherlands -0.02 -0.02 -0.05 -0.03 -0.02 -0.04 -0.01
Portugal -0.09 0.05 0.26 0.40 -0.37 0.37 -0.06
Spain -0.47 0.08 0.80 0.86 -1.91 2.77 -0.32
Great Britain -0.14 -0.17 -0.28 -0.05 -0.08 -0.10 -0.03
EU-11 -0.08 -0.05 -0.04 0.02 -0.14 0.16 -0.04
Rest of World - - - - 0.16 -0.14 -
After Tax 
Real Wage 
Rate [%]
Non-Labour 
Income [%]
Permits Price   
[ECU/t SO2 ]
SO 2 -
Reduction 
PP [%]
national SO 2 -
Reduction [%]
SO 2 -
Depositions 
[%]
Deviation from 
Oslo De-
positions [%]
Belgium -0.01 -0.05 1,419 34 13 -14 23
Germany -0.17 -0.70 1,419 19 10 -7 20
Denmark -0.17 -0.52 1,419 12 8 -12 27
France -0.04 -0.24 1,419 40 11 -10 8
Greece 0.02 0.95 1,419 59 42 -14 -8
Ireland 0.09 0.20 1,419 44 6 -23 16
Italy -0.06 -0.39 1,419 27 12 -7 6
Netherlands -0.07 -0.22 1,419 35 19 -15 28
Portugal 0.27 1.64 1,419 44 17 -33 -30
Spain 0.83 7.52 1,419 56 38 -32 -29
Great Britain -0.37 -0.59 1,419 44 29 -25 17
EU-11 - - 1,419 42 24 -17 5
Rest of World - - - - - - -
Scenario 2: Coordinated EU-wide permits scheme
Source: KOSCHEL et al. (1998). PP  Power Producers.
Note: The emission reductions to be realized by the electricity sector via the permit scheme cover only a part of the total national obligations given by the Oslo Protocoll. Hence,
the figures presented in the last column of the table (deviation from Oslo deposition) imply that those emission reductions that have to be undertaken by other sectors (and other
instruments) are realized with certainty. However, the impacts incured by these ‘non-electricity’ efforts are not considered in the figures of the table.
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4 Lessons learned from the United States
Experiences with tradable permits in pollution control were already gained in the
United States. The Regional Clean Air Incentives Market (RECLAIM) was
implemented in 1994 in the region of Los Angeles; the Acid Rain Program (ARP)
started in 1995 on a national scale.12 Both programs can be classified as UDP-
schemes. The ARP sets limits on SO2-emissions from fossil fuel-fired power plants.
The program has a broad range as power stations account for roughly 66 per cent of
SO2-emissions in the U.S. (OECD 1997). RECLAIM establishes caps for emissions
of SOx and NOx from industrial companies emitting more than 4 tons of either
pollutant.
The question raised in this section is whether the two programs established liquid
and functioning markets that send out stable price signals. As explained in Section 2,
this is a necessary condition for the emission permits approach to develop its full
potential as a cost efficient environmental policy instrument.
After eliminating the distorting effect of permits bought by an environmental group,
KOSCHEL et al. (1998) calculate for RECLAIM a trading volume of 2% in SOx
permits in the first year - a very low figure. Information on volume and prices in
auctions and in bilateral trade is limited for RECLAIM. But the given data indicate
that prices are developing unsteadily and are far below the level estimated before the
program started. Permits dated 1994 were estimated at 577 US$/ton SOx before the
program started (ZAPFEL 1996, p. 40), whereas the actual average price for this
vintage is 13 US$/ton SOx (SCAQMD 1996, pp. 29,31). Prices for actual vintages
are even lower according to recent information of one of the two broker firms
(CANTOR FITZGERALD 1998). All this leads to the conclusion that traded volumes are
too low to enable a steady movement of prices.
In the ARP, following a period of relatively low prices in early 1996, allowance
prices have since risen and are now on a stable path, as can be seen from Figure 3.
From the beginning, prices were lower than expected, as Figure 4 demonstrates.
Despite low permit prices, the volume of trade in ARP lies below the initial
estimates. WINEBRAKE et al. (1995) for example estimated a volume of 30 per cent.
KOSCHEL et al. (1998) calculate an attained volume of 17 to 24 per cent, and
SCHWARZE (1997, p. 174) 15 per cent.
                                          
12
 cf. for ARP WASMEIER (1992), ENDRES/SCHWARZE (1994), and MOSTAGHEL
(1995), and for RECLAIM COHEN (1993), BADER/RAHMEYER (1996),
FROMM/HANSJÜRGENS (1996,) and SCAQMD (1996, 1997).
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Only if markets of tradable permits are liquid and prices show steady movements can
the cost savings of a permits approach, in comparison to the traditional EU-command
and control policy, be exhausted. Some scepticism about RECLAIM seems to be
reasonable in this respect, whereas under ARP the development of prices points to a
functioning market. Besides, trade volumes are growing steadily in both programs13
indicating an increasing acceptance of the tool ’permits trading’.
                                          
13
 cf. U.S. EPA (1998a) for ARP and CANTOR FITZGERALD (1996) for RECLAIM.
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In order to learn from the U.S. about an appropriate European SO2-permits scheme, it
is necessary to scrutinize the possible reasons for low volumes of trade and erratic or
unexpectedly low prices. Definite conclusions regarding the reasons cannot be made
yet because of the early program phases. Nevertheless, some preliminary thesis can
already be put foreward.
- One reason for "unexpectedly low" prices seems to be the fact that under the
predominant policy of command and control, the companies had an incentive to
overestimate the abatement costs. Not only does this create a discrepancy between
estimated and actual values, but also exerts influence on actual values, as
SCHWARZE (1997, p. 177) points out. Emission sources which relied on the
distorted information took early action in the form of technical options, as permits
trading seemed a too expensive alternative.
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- A second reason is that the dynamic efficiency of the permits market was
underestimated, i.e. the potential of innovation and the resulting long-term cost
reductions of a permits scheme.14 This again raises the attractivity of technical
options.
- The incentives of the permits scheme may have been superimposed by other
national and state environmental policy measures. For example, some states
established emission limit values for existing or ‘best available technology’-
prescriptions for new power plants. Also, regulations for particular matters may
imply a significant reduction of SO2-emissions, too (SCHWARZE 1997, pp. 180-
181).
- In addition, low prices may be attributed to the generous placing of excess
allowances15 as well as to the relatively generous initial allocation of permits to the
companies concerned, which go beyond the real need.16
All four factors diminish net demand and raise net supply of permits so that prices
will fall. But they do not explain why the trade volumes were lower than expected.
Theoretically, volumes may rise, fall or be constant. Two reasons why volumes may
be low are:
- Transaction costs may reduce the willingness to pay of potential buyers and the
claims of potential sellers (cf. STAVINS 1995 and DOUCET/STRAUSS 1994, p. 766).
- The incentives of the permits scheme may have been superimposed by non-
environmental policy measures. For example, cost recovery rules for power
producers imply that profits from selling permits have to be passed on to
consumers. In addition, at least in Phase I of ARP, power producers may be
concerned that they themselves would have to bear the risk that decisions
concerning permit transactions might not be acknowledged under the Prudent
Investment Test (KOSCHEL et al. 1998).
In both cases, prices will fall while the development of equilibrium volumes is
undetermined. All six aspects seen together can explain the phenomenon of low
prices and quantities observed under the Acid Rain Program.
To summarize, RECLAIM tells us that small markets and a too generous initial
allocation of permits may lead to an erratic development of permit prices. In contrast,
the ARP can be valued as being a successful, practicable implementation of the idea
of emission permits for the pollutant SO2. The volume of trade is lower than
expected but sufficiently high enough to generate a steady and stable price signal.
                                          
14
 In the ARP, this process was supported significantly by deregulation in the gas
industry and in the transport sector (ELLERMAN/MONTERO 1996, p. 5).
15
 Under the ARP (cf. CONRAD/KOHN 1996, pp. 9-10).
16
 Under the RECLAIM (cf. BADER/RAHMEYER 1996, pp. 68-69).
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The relatively low permit price is not so much a sign for a non-functioning of the
market as a hint to its dynamic efficiency we expected from the theoretical results.
Abatement options start to compete, as we see from the fact that fuel blending
techniques have been improved considerably and prices for flue gas desulphurisation
facilities dropped by 50 per cent since 1989 (BURTRAW 1996, p. 89, and FEDER
1996).
In order to establish a European permits scheme that helps to realize the ceilings of
the Protocol of Oslo in a manner that is cost efficient in the short term as well as in
the long term,17 we learn that
- Markets for tradable permits should not be too small.
- The initial allocation of permits must not be too low.
- Transaction costs should be kept low.
- A superimposition of the scheme by other environmental or non-environmental
regulations has to be avoided, e.g. ’best available technology’ prescription must be
eliminated, and emission values have to be abolished or frozen at a moderate level.
- Sectors under pressure should not be assisted by excess allowances but rather by
other instruments (e.g. financial transfers).
Finally, one yet neglected aspect shall be mentioned, as it gives us additional insights
about the successful implementation and design of a permits scheme. CONRAD and
KOHN (1996, p. 6) state that information about the magnitude of possible cost
savings as well as the choice of the grandfathering procedure were decisive factors in
both the RECLAIM as well as in the Acid Rain Program in order to raise the
acceptance of permits trading by the affected sources.
5 The technical and economic setting in Europe
Big thermal power plants in Germany, Belgium, Austria and Finland are already
fitted with flue-gas desulphurisation processes to a high degree. In Greece, Portugal,
France, Italy, Sweden, Ireland and the Netherlands more than 50 per cent of the
installed capacity is based on low sulphur fuels. A low coverage of plants with end-
of-pipe sulphur control technologies can be recognized for Greece, France, Portugal
and Denmark (between 40 and 50 per cent of the net capacity), as well as for the
United Kingdom and Spain (between 80 and 90 per cent). All in all, there is a high
                                          
17
 Note that fully functioning permits markets are estimated to bring along cost
savings of 40 to 60 per cent for ARP (according to studies of the U.S. Government
Accounting Office cited by ZAPFEL, 1996, p. 24, and of ICF Resources Inc. cited
by RICO, 1995, p. 120) and about 30 per cent for RECLAIM (cf. KOSCHEL et al.
1998, based on BADER/RAHMEYER 1996, p. 64), compared to command and
control measures.
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potential for SO2 emissions reductions in EU-15 electricity production. A big share
of existing plants (representing 31 per cent of total net capacity) has no control
technology. Another 28 per cent of the capacity is presently fired with gas or other
low sulphur fuels and could be combined with additional control technologies (own
calculations based on data from EURELECTRIC 1996).
Out of a broad range of established options to curb SO2-emissions, fuel switching
from high sulphur to low sulphur fuels is the less expensive option. But it does not
allow for as high degrees of emission reduction as many emission control
technologies do. Lime/limestone wet scrubbing for example, the most commonly
used flue gas desulphurisation process in Europe, offers a desulphurization rate of
more than 90 per cent. Future SO2-emission reductions according to the Protocol of
Oslo will have to go beyond fuel switching or fuel cleaning towards integrated or
end-of-pipe solutions in many countries. Installing one of the main emission control
technologies will raise power production costs 4 to 14 per cent. But, the costs depend
decisively from the size of the emitting unit. Integrated control options - like
fluidised-bed combustion with a dry additive for SO2-removal fed directly into the
boiler - are competitive for plants up to a capacity of 250 MWe. Above this threshold
standard, end-of-pipe emission control technologies are less expensive (OECD
1993).
An analysis of the economic setting reveals that a European SO2-permits market for
public utilities would be characterized by a sufficient number of agents. A
grandfathering procedure would result in a distribution of emission permits, where
18 public utilities cover approximately 78 per cent and 39 public utilities
approximately 92 per cent of all permits (KOSCHEL et al. 1998). Nonetheless, the
number of agents seems small enough to keep transaction costs of measuring
emissions and supervising the agents low. The figures indicate conditions at least as
good as those in Phase I of ARP.18 All in all, market imperfections in the form of
"cost-minimizing manipulation" or "exclusionary manipulation", mentioned on
Section 2, are not probable.
Only with full information about the site-specific marginal abatement costs can the
question of the potential trading volume under the proposed scheme be answered
precisely. The general equilibrium modelling calculations made for public utilities in
EU-11 indicate that a share of 31 per cent of all permits may be traded (KOSCHEL et
al. 1998). As alredy mentioned, for ARP as well, a volume of 30 per cent had been
                                          
18
 Fossil fired combustion plants participating in Phase I emitted 8,7 million
tons SO2 in 1990, whereas public power producers in EU-15 emitted 8,6 million
tons SO2 in 1990. Phase I of ARP originally covered 111 ‘dirty’ plants with
altogether 263 units. The proposed European scheme for power producers would
comprise 476 power plants with 671 fossil fired units.
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estimated, while in the years 1995 and 1996 only approximately 17 to 24 per cent
were realised. Nevertheless, as can be seen from Figure 3, this volume is enough to
guarantee a steady development of prices and thus the functioning of the permits
market.
The degree of competition in the European national electricity markets differs, but is
generally low. Even though we can observe in almost all countries efforts to
liberalize the markets, there are still enough distortions to enable most national
power producers to pass on the costs of permits or of a new emission control facility
to their customers without a major risk of losing market shares or to reduce profits.
This situation does not impair the functioning of the permits markets, but implies
different cost burdens to different producers. And by that, the effect observed in the
previous section may be intensified in particular countries: If within a European
permits market power producers reduce more than under a national scheme, and if
they operate in monopolistic or oligopolistic national energy markets, the national
economic losses will even be higher than under competitive markets. Or, in countries
with liberalized energy markets, the danger that a European permits scheme raises
economic losses for the whole economy is reduced.
6 A European SO2-emissions trading scheme
In this section, a concrete SO2-emissions trading scheme for public utilities is
elaborated, based on the previous sections’ findings. Public utilities were chosen as
addressees of the proposed scheme in order to achieve a certain degree of simplicity
in the early phase of the program. They cause approximately 30 per cent of all
anthropogenic SO2-emissions in the EU-15 region. Other sources are intended to join
the scheme in a later phase.
There are several principles underlying the scheme’s design:
- A functioning permits market needs a sufficient number of agents and a sufficient
volume of trade.
This principle led to the selection of a system of undifferentiated emission permits
(UDP) which provides the possibility of banking.
- The mode of the initial allocation should allow for early price signals, in order to
make full use of the instrument’s potential to discover static and dynamic
efficiency gains. 
Consequently, and considering the vested interests of existing emission sources, a
long-term transition from a mode of grandfathering to the mode of a free auction
was chosen for the initial allocation ("limited grandfathering").
- All mechanisms should be simple and reasonable in order to improve the
confidence in the effectiveness of the system. 
Therefore, it is necessary that the emission reduction path (i.e. the number of
present and future permits) as well as all rules governing the permit trade are fixed
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definitely and in advance, in order to guarantee long-term planning security for all
agents involved.
- The maximum capture of the cost-savings potentials involves ecological risks. The
limitation of the risks of hot spots must be assured by a catalogue of optional
measures with different degrees of intensity of intervention. 
Size and point in time of the intervention have to be chosen in a manner which
restricts the degrees of freedom of as few economic agents as possible, and only as
far as it is necessary for ecological reasons.
During the scheme’s conception, the Acid Rain Program functioned as a model. The
major differences lie in the long-term transition in the initial allocation of emission
permits from grandfathering to an auction and in a broader set of options to avoid hot
spots. The details of the proposed scheme are sketched in the following (for a
summary see the Appendix).
As the model shall be obligatory for all EU-15 countries, it is necessary to set up a
single European certificate agency. A structure should be chosen for the certificate
agency, which is divided into an administration unit and an emission council. The
emission council would be authorised to initiate measures which keep the permits
system functioning, such as measures to counteract possible hot spots, or measures
for the fine tuning of the market. The administration - which may be a private
company - will manage the "daily business" of the permit trade, of booking, and so
on.
As criterion for the initial allocation of the permits, the product of fuel consumption
and an emission factor typical for this fuel will be selected. An assignment according
to the actual emissions is rejected, because "pioneers" of emissions control would be
penalized by a low assignment. The emission factor will have to be internationally
differentiated. This is necessary for two reasons. First of all, the national emission
ceilings of the Protocol of Oslo differ from each other. Second, each country is going
to select a different contribution of its public utilities to the overall national
reduction target in order to minimize national reduction costs.
Intranationally, a single emission factor for each fuel should be applied to all
national public utilities. A differentiation into different fuels is necessary, as, for
example, gas has a significantly lower sulphur content than coal. If such a
differentiation did not take place and an average value for all fuels was chosen, the
allocation of permits would be unrealistically low for coal-fired and unrealistically
high for gas-fired plants. A differentiation in terms of a high or low sulphur content
in coal, oil or gas is denied. Regarding desulphurised fuels, again the "pioneers"
would be penalized. A differentiation according to the natural sulphur content is
rejected because it would imply a lower potential volume of trade: The initial
allocation would closely adapt to the actual need, and for any plant the average
demand with respect to the supply of permits would decrease.
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Legal construction: The permits assign the right to discharge one ton of SO2 in a
stated year; banking is allowed, but emission debts will not be granted. The permits
are freely tradable, the owner can keep them, sell them, lease them, or may give them
away. Should one of the utilities shut down a plant, it definitely keeps the permits
assigned to it for the years coming. A withdrawal of the permits if a plant is closed
down would give an incentive to delay an investment into modern and ecologically
friendly technologies. In contrast, the continuing validity of the permits for future
years creates an incentive to replace old plants earlier than planned. Banking, too,
may give similar incentives which in the case of SO2 are meaningful from the
ecological point of view. In the Acid Rain Program we can observe that banking led
to overcompliance in Phase I, in 1996 SO2-emissions stayed 35 per cent below the
legal level (U.S. EPA 1998d).
In order to hand over the control and reduction of emissions to the permits scheme,
all emission standards for existing plants or units have to be frozen on a status quo
basis. In particular, all dynamic standards have to be either anulled or substituted by
explicit standards. New, more strict standards, including those of Annex V of the
Protocol of Oslo, should not be introduced as they constrict the scope of the permits
scheme.
In consideration of the traditional patterns of using the environment, and in order to
avoid abrupt changes, the initial allocation procedure of grandfathering is chosen.
This principle is going to be broken moderately at two points. On the one hand, in
the first years a small amount of approximately 3 per cent of all permits is distributed
by the central certificate agency through auctions and fixed price sales and is not
booked on the accounts of the public utilities. On the other hand, the initial
allocation of permits to existing sources covers only the expected remaining regular
lifetime of the respective plant type. To reach a higher acceptance, a generously
defined "regular technical lifetime" of a plant must be considered. It seems adequate
to take a value of 35 to 40 years. The reasons which support this procedure of a
limited grandfathering trace back on the one hand to distributional aspects and
aspects of competition, and on the other hand to aspects of the functioning of the
permits market. In the first place, the transfer of capital to the existing sources, which
is connected with the grandfathering of tradable permits, should be minimised,
otherwise a distributionally not justifiable preferential treatment of existing sources
vs. newcomers would take place. Secondly, in order to promote competition in the
energy market, it is useful to provide for a long-term rise of the share of permits
which can be auctioned; this makes it easier for new sources to purchase permits. A
third argument is that a long-term growing amount of auctionable permits improves
the price signals which come from each auction.
It is important for the achievement of the ecological targets that the permits, which
rest at the agency because of the limited grandfathering, will not stay there, but will
be distributed to new and old sources by spot and advance auctions. Only in this way
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will the emission reduction path announced at the beginning of the program be met.
In a system of limited grandfathering, a rising share of permits stays with the
certificate agency the longer the program runs, because more and more old plants
exceed the regular technical lifetime. As just mentioned, these permits will be
recycled to the agents via auctions in order to maintain the announced emission
reduction path. At these auctions, growing revenues will be achieved during the
years. They can be used for the coverage of the administration costs of the certificate
agency and for adjustment programs for extremely affected plants, sectors or regions
and countries, as well as for a reserve pool for the fine tuning of the permits market.
The auctions should be carried out by an established stock exchange, which has
experiences with futures markets, in the order of the certificate agency. Because of
the European context, one of the more important European stock markets should be
selected as the main stock exchange. Other parallel stock markets should be excluded
in order to maximize the market volume, liquidity and efficiency of the main market
place. One may consider the establishment of an automatic computer-supported stock
exchange, because of the greater possibility of small frequency of trade in permits in
comparison to other futures markets.
In the U.S. bonus permits were used as an effective instrument to avoid too much
friction. JOSKOW and SCHMALENSEE (1996) state that ARP excess allowances helped
to reduce political resistance, in particular from the side of the coal states in the
Middle West characterized by relatively old power plants. It is possible that such a
need for political cushioning also comes up in the heterogeneous economic
landscape of the EU-15 countries. But, other than in the U.S., this need should not be
managed via special and additional assignments of permits, but via other
instruments, such as financial transfers. A too generous allocation of permits bares
risks concerning the functioning of the permits market.
The binding prior announcement of the emission reduction path and the distributed
permits are major parts of a permits policy which is orientated towards planning
security and, therefore, towards functioning and efficiency of the permits market. For
the same reason, an ongoing rough tuning of the volume of circulating permits is not
planned; it would impair the planning security of the public utilities considerably.
But it could well be that due to progress in natural sciences, the emission ceilings
decided in Oslo could mean a fall below, or an exceeding of, the emission ceilings
now considered necessary. Such a unique rough tuning is acceptable, but one should
take the vested interests of the public utilities into consideration. For example, it
could be decided that rough tuning can only be implemented as part of new
negotiations of the Protocol of Olso or via a decision of the Council of Ministers.
A permits system can only correspond to the receptor-oriented approach of the
Protocol of Oslo if precautions against hot spots are taken. This need can be found
in Art. 2 (1) of the Protocol, which admittedly does not set binding measures to avoid
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hot spots, but asks for long-term containment of the critical loads. One can imagine
different measures in this context, which to a certain extent add up to the permits
system without destroying its basic flexiblity and still look useful to avoid hot spots:
1. Promotion and extension of the estimative capability of existing
monitoring systems about the effects of acid rain in critical regions.
2. Documentation of all permit transactions and emissions of "critical
sources" (power plants whose emissions may contribute to a hot spot
problem).
3. Obligation to register for all bilateral permit trades.
This set of informational instruments establishes an early warning system for hot
spots and prepares adequate countermeasures. If it indicates the emergence of hot
spots, out of the following spectrum of instruments the one should be selected with
the lowest intensity of intervention and which least interfers in the mechanisms of
the permits market. The instruments are command and control measures, but,
different from former policies, they will be implemented on a case by case basis only
for single "critical sources" and only as long as the hot spot problem goes on.
4. Integration of an assessment of risk concerning the effects on imissions
into the approval procedure for new sources in regions where emissions
cause a major problem.
5. Permit trade restrictions for "critical sources" (concerning trade with
less "critical" sources, or, ultimately, even trade among themselves).
Measure 4 is more of a preventive nature, whereas the 5th Measure is put into action.
But, the precondition is that these limitations, which mainly concern the spot market
and the spot auction, are accompanied by preparatory informational measures
concerning all market transactions taking place earlier (bilateral and organized
futures markets and advance auctions). Consequently, this Measure must be linked to
Measure 2.
In case the previously shown instruments are not sufficient to avoid the appearance
of hot spots, ultimately, one has to fall back on a short term and restrictive command
and control instrument:
6. Restrictions in the validity of permits held by "critical sources".
A bubble within this group should be allowed. But ultimately, the affected "critical
sources" will have to implement technical solutions to restrict emissions. Within the
traditional command and control approach, this option is compulsory for all sources
and from the beginning. The proposed permits scheme just takes it as a "lender of
last resort" and thus offers a considerably higher degree of flexibility.
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7 Conclusions
This paper examines theory and experiences with SO2-permits trade and proposes a
practicable scheme of SO2-emission permits for European power producers. A main
finding is that considering the setting in the EU-15 countries, the proposed scheme of
undifferentiated emission permits seems to be economically advantageous. But, there
is an inherent conflict between ecological effectivity and economic efficiency in a
UDP-scheme. Due to the missing differentiation regarding the receptors compared to
other emissions trading schemes, the risk of hot spots increases in the short run. On
the other hand, this risk is lower in the long run, as the cost efficiency of this type of
scheme facilitates the enforcement of new and ambitious emission reduction plans in
the future.
The ecological risks of the scheme seem to be justifiable and should be accepted, in
order to make full use of the gains in static and dynamic efficiency. Nevertheless, a
differentiated bundle of measures counteracting possible hot spots should take a
central role within the practicable scheme proposed in this paper. The use of the
measures should be graded according to their intensity of interference in order to
keep the degrees of freedom for all agents in the market as high as possible.
The cost saving potentials - a lesson learned from the American experience - of an
EU-wide permits scheme may increase the acceptability on the side of the public
utilities and may thus contribute to an acceleration of the decision making process.
The simplicity and the high practicabilitiy of the proposed scheme will support this
process, too.
The mode of primary allocation of permits should allow for early price signals, in
order to make full use of the instrument’s potential to discover static and dynamic
efficiency gains. Under additional consideration of the vested interests of the
existing emission sources, a long-term transition from a mode of grandfathering to
the mode of a free auction was chosen in the proposed scheme. This "limited
grandfathering" is implemented by a primary allocation of permits to existing
sources which only covers the expected remaining regular lifetime of the respective
plant type.
Two scenarios of a set of non-coordinated national permit systems and of a EU-wide
(EU-11) tradable permit system were simulated using the applied general equilibrium
model GEM-E3. The computed variation in the rates of all aggregated
macroeconomic variables caused by an emission permits scheme in EU-11 lies in
both scenarios generally within a range of ± 0.5 per cent. In particular, the potential
seller countries of permits bare the risk of (small) losses, in terms of GDP, as a
sectoral permits system only allows for the minimization of the sectoral costs (of
public utilities). The revenues from selling permits to other countries do not
necessarily cover all national costs arising from the higher degree of emission
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reduction in an EU-wide scheme. The purchasing countries shift a part of the
emission reduction costs on the selling countries. Therefore, a financial
compensation mechanism compensating the divergent national costs of the scheme
should be taken into consideration. This scheme would also allow for an inter-
country compensation of the deviations of the actual national emissions (realized
under the scheme) from the levels fixed in the Protocol of Oslo.
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addressees - large combustion plants in the EU-15 countries
- opt-in for industrial power plants and production processes with combustion
- extension to Middle-East- and East-European countries in the long-run
permit design - locally undifferentiated discharge permits, dated for a specified year
- unrestricted banking for all years and phases
- no emission debts
assessment basis
- SO2 emssions to be monitored by continuous emission monitoring systems
criterion for the
initial allocation
- product of fuel consumption and an emission factor typical for the fuel used
- internationally differentiated emission factors
- intranationally a single emission factor for each type of fuel
legal construction - right to discharge one ton of SO2 in the stated year
- permits are not discounted
- free permit trade (buy, lease, rent, or give away)
- if a plant is shut down before the end of its regular technical lifetime, the owner keeps
the rest of the permits assigned (even those dated for future years)
procedure over
time
- preparatory phase before start of program, incl. advance auctions and bilateral trade
- constant yearly permit allocation for all years of each phase
- dynamics by establishing two phases with different overall emission levels
emission standards
for existing plants
or units
- all emission standards are set on a status-quo basis
- all dynamic standards are either abolished or substituted by explicit standards
- new standards, including those of Annex V of the Protocol of Oslo, should not be
introduced. At least, the standards of Annex V should be postponed from July 1st,
2004 to the starting date of Phase II
emission standards
for new plants - are to be omitted or to be formulated explicitly and moderately
initial allocation
mechanism
Limited Grandfathering
- grandfathering for existing plants before start of program for the defined regular
technical lifetime; the liftetime is defined generously
- 3 per cent of the initial allocation is kept as reserve for auctions and fixed price sales as
long as the agency itself does not dispose over a sufficiently large number of permits
Stock-Exchange Auctions
- in the long run the share of permits initially allocated by auction rises, as for late years
the certificate agency disposes over a larger number of permits remaining at the
agency due to the system of limited grandfathering
- zero-revenue auction if permits have been cut off from the sources’ initial allocation
Spot-Auction
- permits dated for the present year
- once or twice a year
- approximately 0,6 per cent of a year´s
permits
Advance-Auction
- permits dated for future years
- 4, 5, and 6 years in advance
- at least approximately 0,6 per cent of each
year´s permits
- permits resting with the agency due to
limited grandfathering are to be added
Direct Sales from Fixed Price Sales Reserve
- approximately 0,5 per cent of each
year´s permits
- a fair part of the revenue from those
permits that were cut off from existing
sources is redistributed to them
- no fixed price sales of permits dated for
future years
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Utilities
secondary
allocation
Bilateral Trades
- informally by brokers or via stock-exchange
Spot
- presently valid permits
Futures
- permits valid in future years
- futures and options
choice of stock
market
- existing stock exchange experienced with futures
- large European stock exchange as central stock exchange; no parallel stock markets
- possibly automatic computer-supported stock exchange
monitoring - continous emission monitoring systems
- spot checks
enforcement - automatic enforcement
- fee of approximately 1,500 ECU per ton SO2 not covered by permits
- corresponding number of permits is subtracted from the next year´s allocation
balance period - one year
- those months with extreme peaks or fluctuations in electricity production are not to be
set at the end of the period
compensation for
countries and
sectors
- no bonus permits for sectors severely hit; other instruments to cushion too much
friction, such as financial transfers
- no bonus permits for countries suffering an additional economic burden from an EU-
wide scheme; instead scheme for financial compensation
rough tuning - no ongoing rough tuning by the central agency
- an additional reduction of allocated SO2  permits only when taking into account the
plants´ vested interests and only as part of new negotiations of the Protocol of Oslo or
via decision of the Council of Ministers
fine tuning - done by the certificate agency
- aiming at stable prices and a stable market volume when supply bottlenecks,
speculative tendencies and other misdevelopments in the permits market occur
- open market operations, no discount rate policy
avoiding hot spots - various instruments with different intensity of intervention
1. promotion and extension of the estimative capability of existing monitoring systems
about the effects of acid rain in critical regions
2. documentation of all permit transactions and emissions of "critical sources"
3. obligation to register for all bilateral permit trades
4. integration of an assessment of risk concerning the effects on imissions into the
approval procedure for new sources in regions whose emissions cause a problem
5. permit trade restrictions for "critical sources"
6. restrictions in the validity of permits hold by "critical sources". A bubble within this
group should be allowed
- in order to reach an identified ecological target, the instrument having the lowest
intensity of intervention and interfering least with the functioning of the permits
market is chosen
27
References
BADER, P. / RAHMEYER, F. (1996), "Das RECLAIM-Programm handelbarer
Umweltlizenzen - Konzeption und Erfahrungen", Zeitschrift für Umweltpolitik &
Umweltrecht, Vol. 19, No. 1: 43-74.
BURTRAW, D. (1996), "The SO2 Emissions Trading Program: Cost Savings
Without Allowance Trades", Contemporary Economic Policy, Vol. 14, No. 2: 79-
94.
CANTOR FITZGERALD (1996), SO2 Allowance Price Indications. Information sheet.
New York.
CANTOR FITZGERALD (1998), "Market Price Index". http://cantor.com/ebs/marketp.
htm, 12.2.1998.
CAPROS, P. / GEORGAKOPOULOS, T. / VAN REGEMORTER, D. / PROOST, S. /
SCHMIDT, T.F.N. / CONRAD, K. (1997), "The GEM-E3 General Equilibrium Model
for the European Union", Economic & Financial Modelling. Special Double Issue.
Summer/Autumn. Vol. 4, No. 2&3: 51-160.
COHEN, N. (1993), "Emissions Trading and Air Toxics Emissions: RECLAIM and
Toxics Regulation in the South Coast Air Basin", Journal of Environmental Law,
Vol. 11: 255-295.
COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (COM(97) 88 final),
Communication to the Council and the European Parliament on a Community
Strategy to Combat Acidification. (Containing a proposal for a council directive
relating to a reduction of the sulphur content of certain liquid fuels and amending
directive 93/12/EEC, and a proposal for a council decision on the conclusion by
the European Community of the Protocol to the 1979 Convention on long-range
transboundary air pollution on further reductions of sulphur emissions.) Brussels,
12.03.1997
CONRAD, K. / KOHN, R.E. (1996), The U.S. Market for SO2 Permits - Policy
Implications of the Low Price and Trading Volume. Beiträge zur angewandten
Wirtschaftsforschung, Discussion Paper 543-96, Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre
und Statistik. Universität Mannheim.
DOUCET, J.A. / STRAUSS, T. (1994), "On the Bundling of Coal and Sulphur
Dioxide Emissions Allowances", Vol. 22, No. 9: 764-770.
ELLERMAN, A.D. / MONTERO, J.P. (1996), Why Are Allowance Prices So Low? An
Analysis of the SO2 Emissions Trading Program. Working Paper MIT-CEEPR 96-
28
001, Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research, Massachusetts
Institute of Technology.
ENDRES, A. / SCHWARZE, R. (1994), "Das Zertifikatsmodell vor der
Bewährungsprobe", in: Endres, A. / Rehbinder, E. / Schwarze, R. (eds.):
Umweltzertifikate und Kompensationslösungen aus ökonomischer und juristischer
Sicht; Reihe: Studien zum Umweltstaat. Bonn, pp. 137-215.
ENVIRONMENT WATCH (1997), "EU Acidification Strategy Calls for National
Emissions Ceilings", Environment Watch Western Europe, Vol. 6, No. 1,
10.1.1997.
EURELECTRIC (1996), Eurelectric’s Report on the Application in the Member
States of Council Directive 88/609/EEC of 24 November 1988 on the Limitation
of certain Pollutants into the Air from Large Combustion Plants.
FEDER, B.J. (1996), "Lower Bids Seen At Sale Of Rights To Pollute Air", The
New York Times, 23.3.1996.
FROMM, O. / HANSJÜRGENS, B. (1996), "Emission Trading in Theory and Practice:
An Analysis of RECLAIM in Southern California", Environment and Planning C:
Government and Policy, Vol. 14: 367-384.
HAHN, R.W. (1984), "Market Power and Transferable Property Rights", The
Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 76: 753-765.
JOSKOW, P.L. / SCHMALENSEE, R. (1996), The Political Economy of Market-Based
Environmental Policy: The U.S. Acid Rain Program. Working Paper MIT-CEEPR
96-003, Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research, Massachusetts
Institute of Technology.
KLAASSEN, G.A.J. (1996a), Acid Rain and Environmental Degradation. The
Economics of Emission Trading. Cheltenham, UK.
KLAASSEN, G.A.J. (1996b), Emission Trading for Air Quality Standards: Opening
Pandora’s Box? Paper prepared for the Annual Meeting of EAERE, June 1996,
Lisbon.
KLAASSEN, G.A.J. / FØRSUND , F.R. / AMANN, M. (1994), "Emission Trading in
Europe with an Exchange Rate", Environmental and Resource Economics, Vol. 4,
No. 4: 305-330.
KOSCHEL, H. / BROCKMANN, K.L. / SCHMIDT, T.F.N. / STRONZIK, M. / BERGMANN,
H. (1998), Handelbare SO2-Zertifikate für Europa - Konzeption und
Wirkungsanalyse eines Modellvorschlags. Heidelberg (forthcoming).
29
KOUTSTAAL, P., NENTJES, A. (1995), "Tradable Carbon Permits in Europe:
Feasibility and Comparison with Taxes", Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol.
33, No. 2: 219-233.
MISIOLEK, W.S. / ELDER, H.W. (1989), "Exclusionary Manipulation of Markets for
Pollution Rights", Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Vol.
16: 156-166.
MONTGOMERY, W.D. (1972), "Markets in Licenses and Efficient Pollution Control
Programs", Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 5: 395-418.
MØRCH VON DER FEHR, N.-H. (1993), "Tradeable Emission Rights and Strategic
Interaction", Environmental and Resource Economics, Vol. 3, No. 2: 129-151.
MOSTAGHEL, D. (1995), "State Reactions to the Trading of Emissions Allowances
under Title IV of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990", Environmental Affairs,
Vol. 22: 201-224.
OECD (1993), Advanced Emission Controls for Power Plants. Paris.
OECD (1997), OECD Environmental Data, Compendium 1997. Paris.
RICO, R. (1995), "The U.S. Allowance Trading System for Sulfur Dioxide: An
Update on Market Experience", Environmental and Resource Economics, Vol. 5,
No. 2: 115-129.
ROSE, A. / STEVENS, B. (1996), Equity Aspects of the Marketable Permits
Approach to Global Warming Policy. Paper presented at the Seventh Annual
Conference of the European Association of Environmental and Resource
Economics, June 1996, Lisbon, Portugal.
SCAQMD - South Coast Air Quality Management District (1996), First Annual
RECLAIM Program Audit Report, 12.1.1996, Agenda No. 24. Los Angeles.
SCAQMD - South Coast Air Quality Management District (1997), Second Annual
RECLAIM Program Audit Report, 14.2.1997, Agenda No. 37. Los Angeles.
SCHMIDT, T.F.N. (1998), Integrierte Bewertung umweltpolitischer Strategien in
Europa: Methoden, eine AGE-Modellentwicklung und Simulationsanalysen,
mimeo, Heidelberg (forthcoming).
SCHMIDT, T.F.N. / KOSCHEL, H. (1998), Climate Change Policy and Burden
Sharing in the European Union - Applying Alternative Equity Rules to a CGE-
Framework. ZEW-Discussion Paper No. 98-12. Mannheim.
30
SCHWARZE, R. (1997), "SO2 im Sonderangebot? Zur Entwicklung des US-Marktes
für Schwefeldioxid-Lizenzen und den Perspektiven von Zertifikatsmodellen in der
Luftreinhaltepolitik", Zeitschrift für angewandte Umweltforschung, Vol. 10,
No. 2: 170-186.
STAVINS, R.N. (1995), "Transaction Costs and Tradeable Permits", Journal of
Environmental Economics and Management, Vol. 29, No. 2: 133-148.
TIETENBERG, T. (1983), "Market Approaches to Environmental Protection", in:
Giersch, H. (ed.): Reassessing the Role of Government in the Mixed Economy.
Tübingen, pp. 233-258.
TIETENBERG, T. (1990), "Economic Instruments for Environmental Regulation",
Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Vol. 6, No. 1: 17-33.
TIETENBERG, T.H. (1994), "Market-Based Mechanisms for Controlling Pollution -
Lessons from the U.S. ", in: Sterner, T. (ed.): Economic Policies for Sustainable
Development. Dordrecht, Netherlands.
TIETENBERG, T.H. (1995), "Tradeable Permits for Pollution Control when
Emission Location Matters: What have We Learned? ", Environmental and
Resource Economics, Vol. 5, No. 2: 95-113.
UN-ECE (1991), Exploration of Economic Instruments for Implementation of
Cost-Effective Reductions of SO2 in Europe Using the Critical Loads Approach.
EB.AIR / WG.5 / R.22, 26.6.1991.
U.S. EPA (1996), "Acid Rain Program: Home Page". http://www.epa.gov/
acidrain/ardhome.html, 24.6.1996.
U.S. EPA (1998a), "Acid Rain Program: Cumulative Allowances Transferred
Under the Acid Rain Program". http://www.epa.gov/docs/acidrain/ats/cumtrans.
html, 9.2.1998.
U.S. EPA (1998b), "Acid Rain Program: Monthly Average Price of Sulfur Dioxide
Allowances Under the Acid Rain Program". http://www.epa.gov/
docs/acidrain/ats/prices.html, 9.2.1998.
U.S. EPA (1998c), "Acid Rain Program: The Environmental Impacts of SO2
Allowance Trading". http://www.epa.gov/acidrain/ardhome, 9.2.1998.
WASMEIER, M. (1992), "Marktfähige Emissionslizenzen - Das Zertifikatsmodell
und seine Umsetzung in den USA", Natur und Recht, No. 5/94: 219-226.
31
WINEBRAKE, J.J. / FARRELL, A.E. / BERNSTEIN, M.A. (1995), "The Clean Air Act’s
Sulphur Dioxide Emissions Market - Estimating the Costs of Regulatory and
Legislative Intervention", Resource and Energy Economics, Vol. 17: 239-260.
ZAPFEL, P. (1996), The Concept and Performance of ‘Second-Generation’
Emission Trading Programs. Unpublished paper, John F. Kennedy School of
Government und Harvard Law School, Harvard University, Cambridge, Spring
1996.
